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RECENT BOOKS
BOOK REVIEWS

BENCHMARKS. By Henry ]. Friendly. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. 1967. Pp. viii, 324. $7.95.

A collection of previously published essays is often tedious to read
and difficult to review. What appeared fresh on first publication has
many times become obvious or irrelevant with the passage of time.
Frequently the author gives no indication of his present beliefs or
earlier errors. Benchmarks, a collection of writings of Judge Henry
J. Friendly, suffers from none of these shortcomings. The essays,
written over the past eight years, are as relevant and fresh today as
when they first appeared, notwithstanding that subsequent events
have mooted some arguments. Moreover, two chapters of this volume,
which update earlier writings, are as current as tomorrow's newspaper.
The book contains writings on five general themes. The first
concerns the law-making functions of legislatures and courts, the
business and art of judging, and the study of the law. The second
focuses on the problems of federal administrative agencies, a subject with which Judge Friendly has been intimately involved
throughout his professional career. The third group of essays deals
with the proper relationship between state and federal law and the
growth of the federal common law. The fourth treats what Judge
Friendly describes as the Supreme Court's seeming use of the Bill of
Rights to impose a uniform code of criminal procedure on the states.
The final section consists of essays on the four great judges whom
Judge Friendly has admired most: Holmes, Brandeis (for whom
Judge Friendly clerked), Learned Hand, and Frankfurter.
The thread that unifies these seemingly disparate sections is the
call to those whose decisions affect society to engage in reasoned
decision-making. Judge Friendly states that there is a "need for
judges and administrators to decide cases on the basis of 'clear and
distinct' propositions and to make their reasons for decisions readily
available" (p. vii). He also puts it another way:
It means rather that the decider should cerebrate rather than emote
about what he is deciding; that he should endeavor to provide a
principle that can be applied not simply to the parties before him but
to all having similar problems; that he should tell what he is doing
in language that can be understood rather than indulge in flights of
rhetoric; and that if he finds a principle is not working properly,
he should qualify or overrule it candidly and openly rather than
continue to profess adherence while reaching inexplicable results.
[P. vii.]
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To achieve this goal, the "decider" must have great knowledge and
understanding-both of the law and of human nature--combined
with courage and a sense of humor.
The book is beautifully written. There are few writing anywhere
today (certainly few lawyers) with a felicity of style to match Judge
Friendly's. His sense and use of imagery and his deft references to
history, literature, and music enhance the reader's pleasure and
understanding while giving added dimension to his arguments. He
also has the rare gift of ·writing a paragraph which makes the reader
anticipate the next with pleasure. There is scarcely an essay in which
his great wit, sensitive taste, and impeccable style are not present. Indeed, this reader had to control his involvement in Judge Friendly's
prose so that he could focus on the ideas being expressed-an equally
enjoyable task.
While the reviewer has occasionally considered and struggled
with the answers to difficult and specific questions so logically put
by Judge Friendly's court, the book takes these questions and weaves
them into a larger tapestry. Often this is done by describing a case
in new ways so as to challenge the reader to re-examine the case and
his own thoughts on it. One example will suffice:
More dramatically, as the result of the encounter between an Erie
freight train and the not otherwise illustrious Tompkins in Hughestown, Pennsylvania, in the early hours of a July moming in 1934,
what was thought for a century to be a happy hunting ground for
the creative effort of federal judges was abruptly fenced off, and their
activity denounced as poaching on the preserves of others. [P. 43]
The significance of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 1 for federal
judges deeply concerns Judge Friendly. He develops this theme in
several essays in the book, the most important of which is In Praise
of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law. 2 Perhaps because
he is a former Brandeis clerk, he feels the reader may subject his
discussion to the most critical analysis. He is particularly eager to
prove that the detractors of Erie do not really appreciate its meaning
and effect, as well as to defend the result and the opinion in the case.
He rejects the view that Erie limited the freedom and ingenuity of
federal judges. He argues that, in fact, the decision, by relieving
federal courts of the substantial burden of dealing with matters of
local and limited concern, made it possible for those courts to use
their time and skill more productively and fruitfully in developing,
in areas of national concern, a true federal common law.
As Judge Friendly recognizes, the federal courts have been assisted
in this by the rapid growth of the newer areas of the law opened up
I. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Reprinted from 19 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64 (1964); also reprinted in 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383 (1964).
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by congressional concern with problems with which the states were
unable to cope. He cites the willingness of the federal courts to imply
private rights of action against corporations and their managements
for violations of rule 10b-5 3 under the Securities Exchange Act of
19344 and other provisions of the federal securities laws as an example of this type of development. 5 The resulting "federal common
law of corporate responsibility" (p. 186) is, with only a few exceptions, uniform, binding in every forum, and, consequently, predictable. Before Erie, of course, this was an area foreign to the federal
courts.
Judge Friendly's analysis of the growing application of principles
of federal law to the rights and duties of stockholders and corporate
officials is, not surprisingly, particularly acute, for he has been instrumental in that growth. His opinion in Brown v. Bullock6-"decid[ing] that the standard of conduct to which directors of a registered
investment company must conform in voting the renewal of a contract
of an investment adviser or principal underwriter as required by
section 15 of the Investment Company Act is a matter of federal law"
(p. 187, footnotes omitted)-is significant and far-reaching. It was
also among the early cases to imply a private right of action £or a
shareholder under the federal securities law, and subsequent opinions
have relied heavily on his opinion in this case.
Judge Friendly wrote In Praise of Erie in 1964; subsequent
federal court decisions demonstrate the accelerated development of
the federal law of corporate responsibility which that essay presaged. 7
In part, the nature of the modern corporation-whose problems and
business transcend state boundaries-accounts for this development.
It can also be explained in part by the recent tendency of some state
legislatures to weaken rather than strengthen their corporation codes,
thereby abandoning their efforts to legislate standards of conduct for
corporate managers. 8 More and more shareholders now enjoy fewer
and fewer protections under state law. The fear which Judge Friendly
expressed in 1964-that state legislatures would impose too rigid a
burden on corporations and corporate managers-has proved groundless, and the federal courts have stepped in to fill the resulting gaps
in shareholder protection. 9
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1968).
4. 15 u.s.c. 78 (1964).
5. E.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415
(2d Cir. 1961); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), as
modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (1947).
6. 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
7. E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Bard v.
Dasho, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Mutual Share Corp. v. Genesco Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1967).
8. Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875.
9. Some states have resisted the tendency and have strengthened their corporation
laws. For example, see the proposed California Corporate Securities Law of 196S, par-
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A striking comparison exists between the developments in state
corporation law in the United States and provincial corporation law
in Canada, where the provinces have jealously guarded their sovereignty against alleged attempts at inroads by the federal government.
In Ontario, for example, the Lawrence Report10 examined the existing Ontario Corporations Act11 and found it deficient in the protections which it afforded shareholders. The Report recommended
numerous changes in the Act, including the authorization of the
derivative suit, the existence of which in British law has always been,
in the view of some, questionable. The Report also recommends
strengthening the independence of auditors, and the adoption of a
clearly defined set of obligations to be placed upon corporate management. Legislation to implement some of these recommendations has
already been introduced, but has not yet been adopted.
The most significant current material in the book is found in the
two chapters dealing with recent Supreme Court decisions on criminal procedure. These chapters contain a closely reasoned dissent
from decisions such as Escobedo 12 and Miranda, 13 and they demonstrate Judge Friendly's willingness to take the less popular view on
crucial issues.
In essence, he argues that the Supreme Court's opinions in these
cases detract from an ordered development of the law, and that the
Constitution did not require the Court to lay down detailed rules
of criminal procedure which are binding on both the federal government and the states. He sees the problems of balancing the demands of
society against the rights of the individual who is suspected or accused
of a crime as too complex to be resolved in the framework of constitutional absolutes. He contends that the variety of local experiences
in law enforcement must be considered in achieving the necessary
balance. He also argues that satisfactory results can be reached only
after a careful study of the nature and effect of every stage of the
pretrial process, and he invites "Brandeis briefs" on this subject. As
he puts it, w,e must know "how far 111.iranda will have prevented the
detection or the successful prosecution of serious crime and the rendition to the victim of the aid society owes him, when questioning not
offensive to a general sense of decency would have yielded a better
result" (p. 283). Until we know this-and Judge Friendly recognizes
that the answer will not be easily obtained-he mistrusts the absolutes
ticularly § 25,402 which is patterned after the S.E.C.'s Rule I0b-5 and the decisions
under that rule which have given it flesh and blood. I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. ,I 8497-36
(1968).
10. ONT. SEC. CoMM'N SELECT COMM. ON COMPANY LAW, 1967 INTERIM REPORT
(available from the Queen's Printer, 26 Breadalbane St., Toronto, Ontario).
11. ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 71 (1960).
12. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and the specifics which he feels have filled the Supreme Court's
opinions.
This brief summary cannot do justice to the sophistication and
erudition of Judge Friendly's argument. It is an argument which is
entitled to additional force because it is accompanied throughout by
an obvious and ungrudging concern for the individual and his rights.
Like Justice Frankfurter, whom he admires so much, Judge Friendly
is deeply involved with the rights of man, and yet, like Frankfurter,
he believes that the Supreme Court, in the name of those rights, has
been acting unwisely and without historical or legal support.
The subject to which Judge Friendly allots most space is the
performance of federal administrative agencies.14 He has long been
one of their most articulate critics; this book includes some of his
earlier writings15 as well as his analysis of the agencies' more recent
performance. His criticism of the agencies relates principally to what
he describes as their failure to develop standards sufficiently definite
to permit fairly predictable decisions, and their failure to articulate
the reasons for these decisions so that they might be understandable
by those subject to the agencies' jurisdiction. He is almost equally
concerned with the agencies' failure to recognize and to deal with
problems before they reach a stage of crisis. He has directed other
major criticisms at the increasing delay in the disposition of cases,
the neglect of rule-making, and the overemphasis on ad hoc decisions.
Judge Friendly suggests remedies for these defects, although he
is shrewd enough to recognize that cures cannot be effected overnight. He believes that agencies have an obligation to improve themselves through the hiring of better staffs, but, he comments, able
permanent staffs are possible only if the agencies are manned by
members of high quality. Moreover, he suggests that recruitment
and retention of able staffs are possible only when enabling statutes
provide clear legislative mandates and permit the agencies to implement and enforce them without fear of retribution from constituents dissatisfied with the agency's decision. He rejects the suggestion that agency performance would improve if the policymaking
and adjudicatory functions were separated.16 Such fragmentation,
14. Judge Friendly limits his discussion to the principal independent regulatory
agencies.
15. Chapter 5 of Benchmarks is a reprint of A Look at the Federal Administrative
Agencies, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 429 (1960); chs. 6 &: 7 are reprinted from H. FRIENDLY,
THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINmoN OF STANDARDS (1962).
'
16. Accord, Hector, Problems of the C.A.B. and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960); letter from Newton M. Minow to the President,
May 31, 1963 (available from the Federal Communications Commission). For other
views in support of Judge Friendly's position, see W. CARY, PoLmcs AND THE R.EGU•
LATORY AGENCIES (1967); Auerbach, Some Thoughts on the Hector Memorandum, 1960
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even if possible, would lower the agencies' performance and morale.
In his new essay Watchman, What of the Night? Judge Friendly
notes that agency performance has improved since his initial wTitings. He attributes some of this to stimuli such as the Administrative
Conference and to the higher caliber of men appointed as agency
members. 17 He also detects increased willingness by agencies to issue policy statements and to rely to a greater extent on rule-making
procedures; he singles out the F;,ederal Trade Commission's Trade
Regulation Rules for particular praise.18 While recognizing that
adjudication is often useful, 19 he nevertheless reiterates his strong
preference for rule-making as the principal weapon in an agency's
policy-making arsenal. He believes that agencies should prefer rulemaking to adjudication in three situations: when a detailed code
of conduct or set of standards is to be prescribed; when the agency's
statement of a principle will be in numerical terms; and, when the
agency is about to move into an area in which it has previously not
exercised its jurisdiction.
Whether rule-making or adjudication is the better method for
the development of policy is a question to which every professor,
practitioner, judge, and agency member is drawn. 20 Unfortunately,
this is a question frequently better-suited to the theoretical analysis
of the printed page than to the practical world in which agencies
must operate. In that world, the intellectual, political, and philosophical predilections of agency members may facilitate, if not make
essential, the use of one technique rather than the other to deal with
and to conclude necessary business.
Clearly, there are many advantages in the use of adjudication.
Agency members will often agree more readily on the language of
a policy statement when that language appears in an opinion based
on a specific record than when it is put in a rule which, divorced
from the limitations of a record, may be susceptible to broad application. The power to institute proceedings also affords an agency
the opportunity to insure that cases which raise important policy
questions come before it. An agency seeks consistency in its decision
wherever possible, and this consistency should result, as it does in
WIS. L. REv. 183; Auerbach, Should Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudicatory
Functions?, 1959 WIS. L. REV. 95; 1 K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.04 (Supp. 1965).
17. Judge Friendly is kind enough to include me in the group he cites. Apart from
this slip, I agree with his argument and with his examples.
18. E.g., the rule on cigarette labelling. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964).
19. He cites with approval the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts &: Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961).
20. See, e.g., ·w. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967); Cohen &:
Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative
Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 691 (1964); Elman,
Rulemaking ProcedtLres in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARv. L. REv.
385 (1964); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development
of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965).
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the courts, in a body of law from which meaningful standards can
be distilled. And, as Judge Friendly recognizes, it is often better for
an agency to deal with a variety of specific situations in actual cases
before attempting rule-making. 21 Adjudication is not, however, without its weaknesses. It is necessarily a slow process, and the final record may not be sufficiently complete to afford the agency adequate
opportunity to articulate broad standards. When dealing with a
limited record, agencies will respond as courts do: deciding on a
narrow ground and sometimes not reaching the major issues raised
but insufficiently developed in the case.22
The advantages of adjudication should not blind an agency to
the benefits to be gained from rule-making. When important to do
so, agency members can and do quickly unite on the language of
a rule which solves a pressing problem. In complex situations, rulemaking may be the easiest, and perhaps the only, way to obtain the
facts necessary to govern particular behavior. It is also the simplest
device for obtaining or soliciting the views of all parties whose activities the agency's decision may affect. On the other hand, the type
of conduct to be regulated, fraud, for example, may be so difficult
to define in a rule without encompassing other activities not intended to be reached that the agency has no choice but to rely upon
adjudicated cases.23 Indeed, in these situations, the decision to rely
upon rule-making may create serious problems of enforcement if
the adoption of a rule is delayed or abandoned.
Judge Friendly stresses rule-making because he believes it is the
way best to satisfy the concern which is at the core of his principal
theme-the necessity for agencies to articulate their reasons for action or inaction. As he recognizes, the choice between adjudication
and rule-making is not one between ad hoc decisions and formulating
broad standards. An agency must maintain flexibility, but, more
critically, it must develop understandable standards which will permit those whom it regulates to order their behavior with some
knowledge of the potential consequences.
As one who participates in the daily business of being an agency
member, I am heartened by Judge Friendly's optimistic answer to
his own prophetic question. 24 Despite his criticisms, he expresses a
more hopeful, confident view of the administrative process than do
21. See, e.g., Friendly's comments on the SEC's Cady, Roberts decision (pp. 145-46).
22. Much has been written about Judge Friendly's criticisms of the administrative
agencies, but it is interesting to note that he levels many of the same criticisms at the
courts. Indeed, the passages in which he assesses the strengths and weaknesses of both
courts and agencies are among the most significant in the book to the agency member
and private practitioner.
23. For a further discussion of my views on the possible hazards of rule-making,
see my review of ,v. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES in Cohen, Book
Review, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 399 (1968).
~4. Isaiah 21:II,
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many recent writers. Indeed, his view seems far mellower today than
when he first examined administrative agencies. I think this is because he is now primarily concerned with the substance of the administrative process rather than with its procedural shortcomings,
real or supposed. Recognizing how much regulation pervades our
daily lives, he now urges the agencies to fulfill their original promise
by utilizing their expertise sensitively and intelligently. If we in the
agencies succeed in this task, we must acknowledge how much of
our success is due to the stimulus he has provided us (and for which,
characteristically, he does not take credit) in recent years.
The last few chapters are devoted to his reflections on four great
judges. He recognizes and enjoys their literate qualities, their sensitivity, and above all their appreciation and recognition of the
fallibility of man. Judge Friendly will one day be counted among
them.
A careful reading of the book leaves the reader with a deep admiration for Judge Friendly as a man, as a literary craftsman, and
as a judge. His writings are marked by a constant search for a rational and consistent view of society and the role of law; and, like
other great judges, he is a humanist rather than a narrow-minded
preacher. Writing these essays appears to have given him pleasure.
Reading them gave this reviewer both pleasure and a pride that
our system can produce a judge with his unique qualities.
Manuel F. Cohen,*
Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission

• I would like to acknowledge the assistance provided by my legal assistant, Jeffrey D. Bauman, in keeping my nose to the grindstone and otherwise assisting in the
preparation of this review. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of
policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication by any of its members or
employees. Therefore, the views expressed here are the author's own and do not nec~ssarily reflect the views of the Commission or its staff.

